lundi 17 juin 2019

Keeping the Bigger House

There are many ways society could operate. Whichever way it does operate, that set of conventions, rules, practices is biologically speaking an environment. Unless the system is extraordinarily comprehensive, some people will thrive wonderfully and others will falter or die. This is not necessarily because some people are overall superior and others inferior. Much of it is simply because some people naturally align well with the "artificial environment" of society's rules in that era, and others don't align well. In times past, and in some ways still, if you were a woman, there were so many ways it would have been drastically more difficult to thrive, through no actual fault or inferiority of your own or of being a woman, but rather through the fault and inferiority of the conventions, rules, practices of that era.

This notion generalizes. Increasing numbers of us understand both rationally and intuitively, from experience and education and intelligence and open-mindedness and empathy and compassion and just listening, that this principle of diversity versus conformity covers many genders and ethnicities and traits and persuasions. What the core realization means is that in any human era so far, if you are very successful, that is always, inevitably, in part because traits you did not choose line up well with the conventions, rules, practices of your time. You are at an advantage compared to others, and it is impossible to calculate, or perhaps even put a solid statement to, how much of that advantage is "fair" and how much is "unfair."

This is one reason progressive taxation makes sense. To the extent you are successful—and in our era this usually means financially—the rules of the social game are clearly in some kind of alignment with you. If this is difficult to agree with, think of it another way. There are rules that, were they changed, would reduce or nullify your success. You are benefitting or even depending on those rules. It is unlikely those rules are benefitting everyone. It is likely some will find them unfair, inadequate, even destructive. A person who feels perfectly at home working in upper management at Exxon is probably very well-off financially, but this is partly because fossil fuels are legal; if fossil fuels were illegal, that income would either dry up or turn illegal. The same person may be able to find another job that pays just as well, or may not. If they can, this is arguably because of other rules, conventions, practices. It's easier to see what I'm saying in the negative. Take away what your success depends on, socially. It didn't have to be there. The social environment could be different, and someone else would prefer it that way. And so paying tax for a system that's working very well for you makes sense, because you didn't create that system that's working very well for you.

I prefer not to use terms like "fair share," because they can be subjective. The logic I'm presenting is, I believe, more indestructible than some particular wording chosen to make an impression. The logic rests on one assumption: the laws could be different. They could. They have been different already. They are different from town to town, state to state, country to country. I'm basing logic on indisputable fact, because that's how logic works best. To put it in perhaps more concrete and immediate terms, a billionaire might not be a billionaire in another country. They might have been murdered, they might have died of typhoid. They might have taken out a loan to start a company and been robbed of it and never gotten another loan, and put in prison for not being able to pay the loan back. Or maybe education in that country would have made the population aware that what the prospective billionaire knows how to make and sell isn't so good for them. What I'm saying is not hypothetical.

Now I don't want to minimize anyone's efforts or contributions or talents or planning or good judgment or anything else. We need these, you need these, I need these, and I appreciate, strive for, and admire these when someone's doing them better. What I do want to do is speak in a kind of basic, scientific, almost mathematical way about the structures in society that don't necessarily have to be how they are. These are the kinds of structures that change over time, even that we agitate to change urgently, because some of us, most of us, notice ways that society could probably be working better, whether that's on a small scale or a large scale. By recognizing that every social convention, rule, or practice has already evolved into place, was another form of itself and earlier than that didn't exist at all, we free ourselves from the notion that the way of the world is fixed, permanent, immovable. The laws of physics seem to be. The laws of humanity seem very much not to be.

Who are you allowed to kill?

No, really, I'd like you to answer out loud. Who are you allowed to kill? The answer to this question tells you something direct, something about law and tradition. I'll give you a moment.

We eat "calamari" and "pork," yet it would be unconscionable in our culture to eat a dog.

Why?

Could the difference be traditional and emotional? I've chosen pigs and squid (being close siblings of octopuses) because their intelligence and even empathy are comparable to a dog's. If we favor dogs because they fawn on us, well, we must admit that we have bred them to fawn on us, so that's ethically problematic.

Even the most basic law that everyone across cultures can agree with, some variation on "Thou shalt not kill," is widely disregarded, and lawfully. You can smash a mosquito. You can wash a spider down the drain. You can agree to have your pet put to sleep. In most US states, you can still abort a fetus. In wars, killing seems to be not only tolerated but encouraged; "seeming" is important, because soldiers who wantonly kill civilians are responding to that seeming. Serial killers are still put to death in many places, and as you look around the world, there are many more reasons seen in cultures as acceptable or necessary conditions for putting someone to death. Killing is sometimes needed for self-defense. No one mourns cancer cells that are cut out, blasted with radiation, or poisoned. For economic survival and gain, it's usually seen as fine to cut down trees, and it's fine if this means animals depending on them die. I say "fine" intending a pun, because usually there aren't even fines. By and large, there aren't many good laws against driving an entire species to extinction. Many laws seem to support heightening the chances of humanity's extinction in the next hundred years or two. This one rule "everyone agrees on" around the world is not exactly a strict and perfect rule, is it?

So who are you allowed to kill?

What's the best rule?

The particular way it's expressed makes a difference, and the conditions around it make a difference. And those details will favor some living beings and disfavor others. And whatever the exact, more detailed form of the rule is, it'll be a rule humans came up with, one that was unspoken, unfollowed, even once unthought, and then it existed in different forms, and could exist in yet other forms, some of which may be kinder to human society and life on earth.

Whatever the rules are that make you possible, that make your success possible or likely, or impossible or unlikely, could have been another way.

This is a basic truth I think we must agree on if we are to be sane and always moving, at least a little bit, toward a better, healthier, more equitable, and more sustainable civilization.

We need to think freely about what can change. Thinking about changing anything does not harm anything. It's thinking. That's what's good about it: it's in a bubble. What you do in thinking is a little, personal sandbox experiment. You can derive insights without moving materials around or threatening anyone with the wrong kind of changes for them.

Many people seem to think that thinking—and its cousins speaking and conversing and debating and making and experiencing art—seem to do nothing, and therefore are a waste of time. Incorrect. All are strictly necessary ingredients of social and global progress. And much of this value is exactly their virtual nature, their safe, sandbox quality. We become insulted when we don't like the way another person is thinking, but this disrespects the biggest value of thought: it's in a sandbox, it's experimental, it's processing, it's simulating a path to anticipate mistakes and avoid them if possible. There's nothing wrong with turning up mistakes in simulation mode. That's exactly what it's for.

We should think differently about thinking, but let me put that aside. What I'm really fighting is status quo bias.

Status quo bias is pernicious. Big changes do need to happen first as little experiments, preferably. It is far more dangerous to gamble with millions of lives than it is to run some careful local experiments and then try to scale them up if they're successful. Status quo bias is helpful in preserving what works. And so it deceives us. It has us thinking that there's something better about tradition itself. It has us thinking there's something worse about saying or doing something that seems weird. It has us convinced we've all got to follow all the rules at all times. It even has us paranoid about the unspoken rules, which are unspoken because the unspoken ones are the most contingent, and by remaining largely unspoken, can change readily when the circumstances change. Status quo bias, respect for and pride in tradition, makes it harder for us to see the truth in what I've been saying above. And it's one of the biggest forces holding humanity back. Status quo bias is more dangerous than big corporations. There is nothing necessarily wrong with a big corporation. In a more equitable world, we could imagine that there would be nothing wrong with voting using money. But status quo bias, left unchecked, will always have serious downsides.

That is, until we have found the perfect society, or even one that's good enough. And we absolutely have not. And if you are content with it, I am not. I do not feel the present era is even close to something I would feel content with myself. The world of today is not good enough, not because it isn't amazing, stunning, and truly awe-inspiring, but because it is unfairly and unnecessarily destroying lives everywhere we look. These lives are not just human, not just animal. They include future lives. That is not good enough. Yes, everyone does die, but no, conventions, rules, and practices that unfairly and unnecessarily destroy lives are not good enough. Does my reasoning sound circular now? It is, a little bit, in the way I've presented it, without the endless examples that could be found, but I don't think it's really possible to disagree with it. That the present state of affairs is not good enough is self-evident. And if it's good enough for you, then I'm happy for you. This isn't about resentment. This is about destruction and changing conventions, rules, and practices in the face of it, to alleviate the destruction, to preserve life at large, to make it possible someday to settle on other worlds without the guilt and embarrassment and failure of having destroyed our own.

We do not really deserve to live on another planet unless we can garden this one beautifully, which to me means allowing lots of wild spaces and figuring out what to do with the different forms of life so that we may coexist. If we can't coexist with ourselves, how would we coexist with aliens? Asking about aliens may seem idle today, a sandbox question, a question in a bubble. But maybe we eat "calamari" and not dogs because cephalopod intelligence is the most alien intelligence on earth, compared to our own. And it is just that traditionally we do not recognize or care about this. If we survive, one day this question will not be in a bubble at all.

In some ways it isn't in a bubble and never was. When we think and discuss, we run a kind of experiment that, over time, can turn surprisingly constructive. Suspend disbelief with me for a few sentences. Maybe now is always a good time to solve problems we see in that bubble, when we pause and draw a circle around us for a moment and stop acting, and think; when we trace possibilities, imagine, fantasize, hypothesize, use counterfactuals, play Devil's advocate, support the underdog view, offer what hasn't been mentioned yet, discuss, argue, go into science fiction or empathy or compassion or art or science or experiences or ways to change rules that we considered permanent and effective.

You think I'm not being serious because I'm talking about playing with ideas. You think the most difficult problems are solved by refusing to goof off. You think there's something wrong with imagining changing an important law. The evidence on how effective solutions are found suggests otherwise. If the problem has already been solved, you ask an expert or perhaps metaphorically go to a library. That's a serious business. If the problem is unsolved, though, you probably have to loosen up and play. If you're feeling too moralistic and standard and full of shoulds, you'll miss what's wrong with morality, standards, and shoulds.

You still think that's small, don't you?

What if nothing is bigger?

And what if playing frees you up to think, with a little less distress and avoidance, about serious problems that do require more of us to think and collaborate? Alfred Hitchcock made horror movies, but on set, he called them comedies. When he and the cast felt stuck on a problem, he'd point out that they were being too serious, and he'd tell an irrelevant but entertaining story. People who worked with him related that after this, the group would mysteriously find it easy to solve their problem. Creativity researchers today understand that this is actually normal. They would expect it. When people have severe illnesses, they joke about it. I saw it regularly in months of chemotherapy for cancer, when I was in chemotherapy myself. When I went in for surgery, I was scared, but no joke from friends or family was wrong. At funerals, laughter can be uplifting. This isn't all frivolous. Some of it actually solves problems, or gives us the strength to approach them.

We likely won't vaporize earth, but it's easy to imagine—realistically imagine—scenarios that render it so inhospitable that we wouldn't go here in a space suit.

These are basic housekeeping concerns we cannot ignore as a species.

lundi 22 avril 2019

The Case for One Global Health

When capitalism works well, participation in each transaction is voluntary. Where it breaks down, participants feel the transactions aren't voluntary, or aren't fully voluntary. Someone paying and someone taking payment as compensation should always have a choice; allowing us traders to choose among a reasonable number of informed options, including the option not to exchange now, is what makes a market coherent.

There are times when choices are spurious. For example, the choice between one health insurer and another is not constructive. What matters to a patient more than anything is the choice of doctor and treatment (along with their availability and quality), not the choice of insurer. Indeed, a diverse market of insurers fragments the pools of doctors, treatments, and patients. Even when looking to the immediate goal of insurance, the more fragmented the pool of the insured, the less the costs can be smoothed out across the population. The worst health insurer is a small, local one with few doctors and dictated treatments. Such an insurer has little choice but to pay out as little as legally possible.

Do you see the simple idea? Some options increase freedom. Others secretly decrease it. We need to focus on finding and maintaining options that increase freedom. Sets of options that ultimately reduce choices and coerce traders should be eliminated.

I have no particular prescription for how many health insurers would be the right number, other than that, based on the above, one would seem to be the best number to start with, and if one isn't enough then it could be increased until it's enough.

We don't have forty thousand internets. We have one. (The local instances of the internet (intranets) that are not connected to the global one may work the same way, but they are not easily confused with the real internet. If I navigate to Wikipedia and Google and Amazon and get nothing, but I seem to have an IP connection active, it's fair to assume I'm not connected to the internet.) Having forty thousand internets would not be better than having one. It would be a dramatic downgrade. It would reduce options for navigating and sharing information to a sliver of what we enjoy now.

So why not have one health insurer? If one isn't enough, try two. If two isn't enough, try three. Having one insurer, or very few, would seem to maximize the number of doctors available to everyone. Then we can focus on paying medical staff for eventual outcomes and quality of care, rather than for the technological and capital intensity of the treatments.

There's nothing magic in what I'm saying. It seems mathematical, but surely it's abstract and short on detail, and I could be deceived. Is the abstraction true to life?

The Faux

Any time someone lectures you about "the real world," they're making things up. What's immovable is a question you should be answering yourself. "The real world" is not what exists materially before us, without humanity. It's what we collectively create. As a map of history would show, you are here. It's your turn.

The WWI-era philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote:

"Es ist offenbar, dass auch eine von der wirklichen noch so verschieden gedachte Welt Etwas—eine Form—mit der wirklichen gemein haben muss."

Translation: "It is clear that however different from the real one an imagined world may be, it must have something—a form—in common with the real world."

And also:

"Um zu erkennen, ob das Bild wahr oder falsch ist, müssen wir es mit der Wirklichkeit vergleichen. Aus dem Bild allein ist nicht zu erkennen, ob es wahr oder falsch ist."

Translation: "In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality."

We are here because we change what's here. Even our seeing is a bit of change.

Reading the above, my brother asked, "Without reality, what are you calling truth or fact?"

And Wittgenstein asked the same thing. But before I return to him, I want to talk about relativism. Post-modernism struggles immensely—and by ensnaring itself in post-modernism, current feminism also struggles in one way I hope we can easily alleviate—with what was expressed so well in the Japanese classic movie Rashomon: our accounts of life all differ, even our experiences of the same event. Yet we still do best to recognize, to admit as a more-than-provisional assumption, a postulate, a precept, an axiom—to take as a given—that external, material reality is also there. We are often surprised by it, by the external, because we did not create it. That is a kind of proof, an empirical one, or as close as we're likely to get, that we cannot be solipsists: surprise is. Surprise is proof there's an outside.

Just cipreyes.

Surprise is information that doesn't come from us. Not the conscious us, and so not the core us in that moment. It's what we listen for and attend to. It tells us reality is out there, not all in here. Maybe that reality resides in our own brain tissue, tissue whose activity isn't part of our consciousness. Often it goes deeper into the distant and unknown and unfamiliar. Others introduce entire unseen realms to us. Many of those exist even without the others guiding us. Objective reality is the common denominator of all our subjectivity and experiences, the reality that precedes their reality and is in turn influenced by their reality. Modern physics contests this in very small but universal ways that are, I believe, fashionably misconstrued by the humanities into all kinds of false relativities. Subjective and objective are both "real" and of spectacular importance, but in different ways. We care about the subjective through empathy and compassion and art and expression. And when we say the subjective is "real," we are aware that it informationally and energetically exists. How you feel is precisely how you feel; that, like you yourself, exists in the universe.

Feminism's emphasis on turn-taking, which is beautifully and disturbingly illustrated in the conflicting testimonies of witnesses in Rashomon, allows us not only to illuminate our inner worlds and see each other's, but also, we should admit, to triangulate in on what's actually happened and examine together what's likely to happen. Wittgenstein asked the same thing about reality—the same thing as feminism and post-modernism, and my brother and the parable of the elephant and Rashomon and every courtroom, and the Persian story of a trusted adviser who tells everyone in a dispute that they're right. The radical philosopher wanted to know how to call something "truth" or "fact" without reference to the outside. Is that possible? Is it just subjective?

For a while, he was obsessed with tautologies and contradictions, statements that logically cannot be false (the number 357 is the number 357) or cannot be fully true (the Titanic is unsinkable; it has sunk). These examples show that for two particular logical categories, you can tell whether a statement is true just by looking at it. The structure of the statement, to some extent, rather than its content, tells you whether it works. No one gets a lot of traction disputing conclusions about statements like these. 357 is 357, and it's also anything else 357 is, like 101 + 256. The Titanic can't have been unsinkable. Maybe an insight or pattern could be extracted from them.

Eventually, he gave up on that. Most statements can't be reduced to one or the other, tautology or contradiction. That isn't necessarily obvious without following the links of word definitions, but maybe it feels easy to believe. Here is a similar idea, a surprise that would seem obviously false. All logically solvable problems can be solved by a relatively simple piece of code, which was written in 1959, only 12 years after Wittgenstein's death. It relies on one core feature of logic. To simplify a little, it only takes one special rule of logic to solve all logical problems. That's pretty unintuitive.

At least, until I supply context about binary numbers: we know that sense information, like all information, can be reduced to binary numbers, and binary operations are generally very simple, yet they can accomplish anything a calculation can accomplish. Still, all logical problems would include all present and future mathematics, everything any piece of software or machinery could ever do, and perhaps anything any of us could ever figure out without simply guessing. This extraordinary ability of one single logical rule is, I'm told, provable (there are different accounts of how many problems can be solved this way in theory), but in practice most problems, even with today's computers, either cannot yet be formulated clearly and specifically enough for the program, or else it would take more than the lifetime of Earth or even the universe to produce its answer. This program, in its original form, is no longer in use, but its relatives have been given jobs simulating human problem-solving and automatically verifying mathematical theorems. It and its creators are widely credited with kicking off the field of artificial intelligence.

So a search for simplicity here, earlier, in the cacophony of World War I, in statements made by humans with words, wasn't necessarily foolish and naive, though it was unusual. Arguably, it's always brave to challenge the obvious in a search for better principles.

This philosopher who began writing in the trenches goes on to say:

"A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to compare it with). In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation."

It seems perfectly unsurprising and not worth saying, once we slow down enough to absorb his Captain Obvious meaning with this line (his writing is not all so easy at all, and I confess I haven't read much of it). But he was challenging and documenting the obvious in search of better ways. He wanted to state the irrefutable. He was trying to record what must be, and branch out from there with logic, like an oak growing from an acorn. We can't really describe anything without referring to a situation, in other words to some potential for objectivity. The words themselves are meant for ears. Ears sense sounds. Sounds are energy waves in molecules. We mutated to speak because carrying and throwing world objects in sounds helped us survive.

When we assert what happens "in the real world," we are painting a picture. It's a kind of stereotype of the world. Sometimes that picture looks so realistic that we forget it's a picture. We forget how deceptive even a photograph can be, and how limited it always is. When most of a population is metaphorically forgetting the difference between a photograph and the entire future world, systematic errors can infiltrate apparently tough-minded views and practices. These become self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating prophecies. We fill prisons with non-violent citizens in a War on Drugs that still doesn't fix the issue. In the real world, you've got to be tough. We subsidize coal instead of renewables. In the real world, coal is what works. We elect a demagogue via the Electoral College, an institution created to prevent the election of demagogues. In the real world, glorious tradition is smarter than the people, and the country would fall apart without the Electoral College.

Realism is practical. Faux realism is the opposite.

It's worth spending time and effort to distinguish one from the other—some of us need to be doing this. Why not most of us? Is that a fantasy? Is our bravery for adventures in realism improving or getting worse? Where's the data? How many of us are checking the facts and the logic, and how are we doing at that, anyway? Almost counterintuitively, the difference between realistic, fauxistic (hehe, I couldn't resist twisting the word), and impractical often comes down to effort. How much effort are we willing to make, ourselves, to develop ideas that are exceptions to the apparent rules? Effort is an ingredient in the practicality recipe. But we'd better not assume we know the extent of that ingredient just from how we feel, or how motivated the people around us seem, or what impression we get from the news. Political will can appear suddenly. It was already there, wasn't it? Was a brick wall in the way? Perhaps it was only perceptions of missing "realism." In the meantime, a realistic change that isn't developed won't look so real, even if it's practical and sustainable.

Realism or faux realism?

A true story can sound made up, and fiction can be utterly convincing. How do we know? Are we going to trust a gut feeling? Shouldn't we be scientific about this?

A woman can't become president.

To me, that sounds plain crazy, but it's still accepted by many. Why not? Let's look at the empirical probability, so far, that this statement will hold up, taking the simplest approach: 45/45. Of historically observed US presidents, all 45 have been guys, and all 58 elections have gone to guys. 45 out of 45, or 58 out of 58, take your pick. That's 1! In probability, 1 means certainty! It's math! History repeats itself! All that experience! However, now let's state the equally obvious. US presidents are not the only presidents, other nations have female presidents, and eventually this trend is almost certain to change here as well. I won't even get into the various reasons why we might specifically need a woman to be president for once, or at least a non-cis man.

A non-Christian can't become president.

These are bets, not realities.

Recognizing that they're bets is the first step.

So far they've held up in one country, but the future is not the past.

Both ordinary examples are faux realism. They sound compelling. Cold hard truth. Like it or not, reality doesn't care how you feel. But these rules aren't what they claim to be. They're historical patterns, actually, not laws of nature, and not even rules. In all likeliness, other factors will soon be more influential than the factors making these trends as consistent as they've been.

Here it only takes a moment to see that these are more trend than fixed truth. In many everyday situations, though, no one makes even that minimal effort. As we get to know the ways of the world, we think more automatically about the familiar. It becomes more of a feeling than a thought, even. We just know. This tendency to think we know from experience, and stop thinking, is called "automaticity" by psychologists, and it's one of the biggest strengths and vulnerabilities of experts. And it's a reason newcomers can sometimes be right in a big way, and naivete isn't always bad.

These non-expert strengths have been given names like "beginner's mind," lack of "functional fixedness," and simply "openness." Anyone can notice something and report what they see. These democratic strengths are a reason that groups allowing all members to take turns and speak up, even newbies and people seen as the least competent, become more intelligent groups, groups that solve more difficult problems better. We value democracy highly for a solid reason that can now be measured. It works better than anarchy, aristocracy, or dictatorship. What we desperately need is to keep searching for the most effective democratic methods. We can't stop. We're not there yet.

Whether we're experts or not, each situation is unique. Oh yes, we'll recognize patterns. Some will be subtle but crucial. Some will be blazing red herrings. Some, we will have to depend on others to tell us about. Events with multiple actors quickly get complicated. Without warning, it will take so much more effort, then, to separate reality from "real world" opinion. Often we don't bother to try. We don't even realize we aren't bothering.

That's important to know and remember, isn't it?

And then there's this effect that's so common that anything else becomes strange and wonderful. Everyone is so determined not to run into any brick walls that they'll feel sure that no one else should be trying to knock down what looks like a brick wall, either. They don't just bet that it won't move; they often want to police their bet that it won't move. It's normal to hear people shaming each other about "the real world" (each word in this usage, "the," "real," and "world," strikes me as ironic), even when the supposedly unavoidable truths are clearly trends and bets specific to the time and place. It doesn't seem to matter. The photograph is the entire future world. Didn't you know that? Any difference doesn't matter, because there isn't one.

There are different trade-offs to different approaches. If we know which approach we're taking and what its strengths and weaknesses are, we're more likely to choose a good one for the situation. We take a turn. We let someone else take one. And they let someone else. And... Now we've completed the circle. Let's admit that trends and bets are critical in life, just as vision is critical—even though it's imperfect and can be hacked by optical illusions. But let's call trends and bets what they are. Let's not call a map a territory.

You are here on a map. And you are out in the territory. And you change the map you express, and you even change the territory. Right now, you're breathing and radiating heat and changing it. Just your heat changes the world around a little bit. And you are not alone, and the map is not all yours, and the territory is not really yours at all. We share a piece of it, but it exists. We cannot capture it. Our words do not replace it.

Fairness is Participatory

Some revolutions that have come out of studying games: probability theory (which leads to statistics, then all modern experimental science), game theory (clarifying economics and evolutionary processes; may also have helped defuse the nuclear arms race), and substantial parts of artificial intelligence. I simply do not believe that games are not important!

It isn't as if the insights above couldn't occur otherwise, but I notice a pattern over the centuries: games are useful!

For one more example, the idea of fairness itself is virtual. Are we all identical? No!!!

So, hold on, hold on. Let's pretend for a moment that we are interchangeable. This is a hypothetical space we're in now. We are not interchangeable, or only in some ways and partially. This is a strong abstraction: there are people in your life you would not allow to be replaced with a random stranger. And imagine how long your workplace would buzz along effectively if you all kept getting swapped out with people off the street. But supposing we were interchangeable, then what should the rules be, and how do things balance out?

That's precisely how a game works: the rules don't care about your name, genetics, or personal history, and you could step out and someone else could take your seat. The rules are tuned to be playable for many people. And that's also the beginning of fairness. Seeing different scenarios as the same and different people as interchangeable requires a hint of make-believe: all scenarios and all people are unique. Fairness can be seen as a flavor of virtuality built into most of us, a half-baked and fallible instinct, one that depends critically on a hypothetical, on unrealities of sameness, on falsifiable abstractions.

It also happens to be very useful in society. Over time, civilization tends toward fairness. The idea is most useful after we understand it. Fairness is a thing we co-create to encourage participation in a better society.

jeudi 28 mars 2019

Types of Reality

There are different kinds of reality.

Sensation. (Measurement.)

Memory. (Record.)

Meaning. (Interpretation.)

Expectation. (Prediction.)

Trend. (Law.)

Externality. (Objectivity.)

Universe.

I imagine these as roughly concentric circles, innermost to outermost. We can know the inner ones most exactly, but we can access only the smallest dot of reality directly from the center. As we move out through the circles, we pass through layers to larger stretches of what's real. The picture gets bigger each time. Every step is fallible. Outside all the circles, we have what actually exists regardless of us, yet it also intimately includes us. The universe contains not only all matter and energy, but also all information, which includes all interpretation and experience.

This is kind of a spur of the moment thing, so maybe the circles could be adjusted.

If you open this image in a new browser tab, you can read it better.

Life on the Shrinking Preservation of the Social Contract

My mother likes to say that the government doesn't make money. This makes sense from a certain standpoint. We pay taxes somewhat under duress, and it's difficult to fire a government when the job isn't done right. They aren't selling their services on an open market.

From another standpoint that acknowledges her objection—and I mean this as a pun—the statement may be wildly inaccurate. You'll see what I mean by the pun in a minute.

Let's imagine something very normal: buying milk at the supermarket. The transaction pays the supermarket and the farmer, and also the government through a tax. Money was made. Who "made" the new value? It would seem to be the farmer most of all, yet the farmer doesn't create milk. The farmer takes it from cows. In fact, the farmer probably pays someone else, or buys a machine. Although there is plenty of work behind the words I just said, the farmer depends entirely on the cows for milk. The cows are also raised and cared for—ideally well, but sadly often not. Either way, there is an outline of a reciprocal relationship. Cows, meanwhile, don't make milk from cow. Cows make milk from grass. This grass doesn't grow from itself, either, but from soil and sunlight. We could step further back into how the sun pushes out energy, but let's stop there.

No one "makes money" alone. That would be impossible. Everything is a transformation of matter and energy, and everyone takes a cut of the energy's influence. Governments provide a stunning number of services and may be the biggest providers of services in the world. In this sense, at least, the government "makes money."

The more interesting practical and ethical question is about opting in and opting out. Let's talk about something strange and unfair and privileged about me for a moment, something I can thank my mother for most of all. As of today, I have three citizenships: American, British, and French. The nice thing about the latter two is that they also carry EU citizenship, so, technically, if I could speak a local language and I was feeling brave enough and competitive enough, I could work in any of those countries like anyone else there. In many of them I could even vote quite quickly, being a resident. So for me, even though all 3 passports are currently expired and need renewing, there is this wonderful sense, for which I am enormously lucky and grateful, of having options.

This is something I would like for every person on Earth. It also comes back to the question of government services. There is research now saying that "big government" actually correlates with happiness and healthier societies. For decades "big government" has been a deep insult on American television. But whether the research has the whole picture or not, we all do intuitively understand, I think, the value of efficiency and effectiveness. If big socially generous governments like those using the Scandinavian model do help support healthy and happy societies, that is not because they are big, but because they are effective and efficient and relatively uncorrupt. They may be "big" in the sense of ensuring many services, but they are not "big" in the sense of being wasteful or bigger than they need to be.

But let me return to the original question and my point. We often rightfully object to services ensured by the government that we do not ratify or even approve of ourselves. The United States split from Great Britain not, perhaps, most of all because of gross humanitarian misconduct, and not even because of an expensive tax, but because of the idea of a tax combined with the insult and impracticality of denying colonials representation in Parliament. Had representatives been in Parliament with influence, they would have debated the merits of a small tax on tea from India to fund the war in India, and whether they won that debate or not, the tax would not have broken into a revolution. Not that year, probably not that century. Eventually, yes. The core dispute was over representation and services, especially at great distance.

Half a century later, or a little more, Henry Thoreau refused to pay his US tax, not because he wanted to stir up trouble, but (if we believe his own words) in spite of his desire to be accommodating and a good citizen. The consequences of this act, of his articulate case for "civil disobedience" and his invention of the phrase used by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. and so many others, were felt around the world and are still felt, but we haven't collectively figured out, strangely enough, what this might actually mean for tax.

The fact is that by living in a country and assuming its citizenship and paying its taxes, we pay for membership in a club and the services it provides with the membership dues and subscription fees of taxes. This is at heart inescapably a social contract.

The trouble is that we are not free to shop around, and so the country of our birth absolutely monopolizes us. When I say "free" I do mean at liberty. You may acquire a citizenship in another country, but rarely easily or quickly. I became an American citizen at 13, having lived here for nearly 10 years. English is my native language. It took about half that time, from entering Kindergarten and being laughed at for my British accent, to learn to speak with an accent more or less indistinguishable from a native's. You can still hear my British accent in my American accent if you listen, and my American in my British, but that's because I speak both all the time and they bleed into each other. If I focus on one or the other for a few weeks, surrounded by others doing likewise, the noticeable influence of the other disappears. As I type now, I'm thinking in a British accent that is not particularly British sounding, in the sense that it is very neutral and unexaggerated. It's just how I learned to speak. Language partly defines us, and it's one of several factors that impede shopping around for the best government "club."

Switzerland is an outlier. It has four national languages. One reason Switzerland's highly capitalist, directly democratic, and relatively socially supportive system functions well is allegedly that, the country being so small, citizens have been able to move a few miles from one canton to another to shop for the best services. In response, the services—the benefits of "club" membership—have improved across the board.

If, like Thoreau, you or I were to go and live in the woods, then we would benefit from few of the overt services of any government, though we would, in a way impossible to calculate, benefit from its protections.

This is where I invite you to consider the terms of subscription to government services, and whether a person should be compelled to belong only to one government. In my opinion, the answer to the second question is "No." My multiple citizenship does not make me superior or immune, but it does make me less likely, I think, to see war as a practical solution, or economic hegemony over more naturalistic countries and societies, or ones still industrializing or trying directly to post-industrialize, to be excusable. We pay so little for the foreign goods we buy so cheap not because they are worth little but because we have the bargaining power to pay little. Multiple citizenship makes this realization bone-deep rather than simply intellectual. That citizen-of-Earth feeling persists, even, I think, if your countries are all "first-world" ones.

We need to make the phrase "social contract" meaningful. A contract is no contract if you are not at liberty to decline to sign it. At present, hunter gatherer societies have little to no protection against the commercial, environmentally degrading encroachments of companies spanning multiple nations. But how many of the employees of those companies work at several companies? How many of them have several citizenships? Or only the default one of Earthling, like my mother when she left Communist Czechoslovakia and the Soviets took her passport? How many of them have time to see what they do to natural landscapes? How many of them have been asked whether they would like to sign the "social contract"? The choice was made for them and they behave as if they have no choice.

If hunter gatherers were protected, if their roaming territories were set aside for them as part of an inviolable contract, then we would have custodians of wilderness. We would have another reason to preserve wildlife: humans are living there and want to live there. It would only be another step from that agreement to realize that animals too can decline to sign our contract, yet should be allowed to live. If you are not at liberty to decline to sign the social contract, it is not a contract.

jeudi 26 février 2015

Discompetitors Aim Distress, Eucompetitors Share Eustress

I often find myself arguing against competition, seemingly in general. This is strange, because I'm very interested in games and game design, and games are competition.

Friendly competition is brilliant.

What many people call competition, the more exclusive kind that I call discompetition, maybe doesn't motivate me as much as it motivates its proponents. If someone seems very motivated to win, openly salivating at the thought of beating me, I find that intimidating and figure I won't have the focus to overturn theirs. The social intimidation side of competition seems to drain my enthusiasm. I suppose that's the point at which friendly competition becomes unfriendly for me.

In my world, the best competition is implicit. Someone is not competing to put me out of the game, but in respect for my skill or potential to gain it. Someone competes with me because we both see deep value in much the same thing. What this person learns, I occasionally steal, and vice versa: we are flattered that the other steals from us. The work is difficult and we don't always like each other, yet there is no cap on applicants to wisdom. We enjoy discovery and compete to beautify the forms by which people can apply.

Notice that neither of us is being driven out of existence. In fact, we wouldn't like that. It would be sad to lose a fellow player, learner, worker.

When I argue against competition, I argue against not eucompetition but discompetition, against not eustress but distress. I argue against industrial-military arms races and all economic practices that allow those in comfort to reduce the comfort of those not in comfort. I argue against the backhanded supposition that each of us is in a struggle for existence against the others: I call it backhanded because it is an insult that creates the situation it describes.

There is a wonderful cartoon of the former corporate structure of Microsoft, with guns pointing in defense against imaginary guns. Competition of this kind creates trenches along every visible boundary (patently ignoring the slipperiness of optical illusions): racism, nationalism, sexism, religionism, generationism, classism. We are forced to unite in these superficial groups to defend against the guns they imagine we are pointing at them.